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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
IN C., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
INTRUSION PREP AKT INC., a cor-
poration, 
Defendant .and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9292 
BRIEF: OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Arnold Machinery Company IS a Utah 
corporation engaged in the equip·ment sales and rental 
business in Salt Lake City, with a branch office in 
Idaho Falls. Defendant Intrusion P·repakt Inc., is a Dela-
ware corporation engaged in the construction business. 
On July 9, 1958, plaintiff and defendant entered into 
a written lease whereby plaintiff rented to defendant a 
large compressor (Tr. 2) having an agreed value of 
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$13,000.00, (Ex. 1) for use by the defendant on a con .. 
struction job near Ashton, Idaho. Delivery was made and 
defendant used the compressor which worked perfectly 
from the time of delivery on July 10 until July 24. (Tr. 
87, 97, 100, Ex. 9). 1\T o corn plaint was made by Defendant 
to Plaintiff until July 24 ( Tr. 87). 
On Thursday, July 24, while defendant was using 
the con1pressor on the job, it overheated and stopped 
operating. Defendant called plaintiff in Idaho Falls in-
forming plaintiff that without compressed air defend-
ant's job was shut down and demanded that plaintiff get 
the machine operating by the next Monday (Tr. 5). De-
spite the fact that July 24 was a holiday and despite the 
fact that the work had to be done on the holiday and 
over the week-end, plaintiff's Idaho Falls men went to 
Ashton to see if they could fix the compressor. Upon 
examination they found that major parts of the com-
presor had been burned out because of overheating and 
towed the compressor back to Idaho Falls. Plaintiff's 
mechanic in Idaho Falls then ascertained that the com-
pressor could not be fixed without new parts 'vhich were 
not available for installation by l\fonday and so ordered 
a new unit from the Salt Lake office for installation 
in the comp-ressor, so that Defendants work would not 
be delayed (Tr. 5). This was shipped immediately and 
was installed in the compressor, and the compressor was 
then delivered back to defendant at Ashton in time for 
defendant's work on Monday (Tr. 5). The burned out 
unit was shipped to the Salt Lake office where is was 
found that the cause of the overheating was the inter-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ruption of the flo'v of oil through the compressor with a 
resultant lack of lubrication. The oil flow had been in-
terrupted because of a brass cutting which somehow had 
gotten into the oil (Tr. 51, 63). \\Then this was ascer-
tained, plaintiff's Salt Lake office asked the Idaho Falls 
branch to flush the oil from the machine to eliminate the 
possibility that other cuttings might be in the oil and 
might damage the machine. This was done (Tr. 7). At 
the request of defendant, certain other minor adjust-
ments were made (Tr. 7) and the compressor was then 
used by defendant until September 20, 1958 with no fur-
ther incident. 
Plaintiff proceeded to repair the burned out portion 
of the compressor in its Salt Lake shops (Tr. 47-81). 
"\"Vhen the repairs were completed plaintiff demanded 
payment for work done, parts and materials furnished 
and expenses incident to said repairs and replacement 
such as telephone calls, towing, freight, etc., basing its 
claim therefor upon the following terms of the Lease: 
"5. . . . lessee agrees to maintain said ma-
chinery and equipment in the same condition as 
when delivered to it by the lessor, usual wear and 
tear excepted and to pay all claims and damages 
arising from defects therein, or from the use or 
handling of said machinery and -equipment, whe-
ther from injuries to the person or property, 
and to pay for all damages to the equipment, 
except the usual and ordinary wear and tear, 
during the life of this contract, and to return 
said property in as good condition as when re-
ceived . . . usual and ordinary wear and tear 
excepted.'' 
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"6. The receipt and acceptance by the lessee 
of said equipment shall constitute aclmowledg-
ment that said pToperty has been accepted and 
found in good, safe and serviceable condition, and 
fit for use, unless the lessee makes claim to the 
contrary to the lessor by registered mail with 
returned receipt demanded, addressed to the less-
or's home office within three days after receipt 
of_said equipment." 
"10. In the event of accident to, or breakage 
of, any part of the equipment lessee may have 
the same repaired by any competent person, firm 
or corp·oration at its own expense or, upon notice 
to the lessor as to such breakage or accident, the 
lessor may repair said machinery for the lessee, 
using reasonable diligence to make said repairs 
or replacement in the shortest possible time, and 
the lessee agrees to pay the lessor its regular 
charges for any material or labor furnished in 
making said repairs upon demand; in the event 
any work is done outside of lessor's regular hours, 
including 'vork necessary by wear and tear, by 
reason of which lessor shall be required to pay 
double time or other overtime charges to its em-
ployees, or to any one doing the work for lessee, 
all such charges will be paid by the lessee to the 
lessor." 
"14. The lessee agrees to pay the lessor for 
all loss and damages occasioned by fire, theft, 
flood, accident, explosion, 'vreck, an act of God 
or any other causes that may occur during the 
life of this lease, and until such machinery has 
been returned into the posession of the lessor and 
accep~ted by it.'' (Ex. 1) 
The dan1age was not due to usual and ordinary 
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wear and tear according to the testirnony of the mechan-
ics ( rl,r. 52, 64). In the opinion of all persons testifying 
on the matter, the work was necessary and all charges 
'vere reasonable in amount. The charges for repair, ma-
terial and parts "rere the regular charges made by 
plaintiff for such labor, material and parts and the 
charges made for expenses incurred were the actual 
a1nounts paid by plaintiff therefor. (Tr. 12-19, 80, 81, 
83, 88). 
Despite the terms and provisions of the lease, de-
fendant refused to make any pay1nent. 
At the close of all of the evidence, plaintiff n1oved 
for a directed verdict in its favor both on the question 
of liability and on the question of the amount to be 
awarded (Tr. 104). This motion was taken under ad-
visement and the matter submitted to the jury (Tr. 104). 
The jury deliberated for a while and then asked for 
further instructions, wanting to know how much the 
repairs cost plaintiff. The court, despite Plaintiff's ob-
jection, instructed the jury that even though there was 
no evidence on the point the jury under the evidence 
before it had the rjght to bring in a verdict awarding 
Plaintiff any amount the jury deemed proper (Tr. 113). 
The jury then promptly brought in a verdict for $2500.00 
instead of the $3580.52 sought by plaintiff's complaint.. 
The court entered judgment on the verdict which 
judgment included interest at the legal rate on the 
amount of the verdict pursuant to oral stipulation be-
tween counsel that the court might add to any verdict 
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interest thereon at the legal rate. 
The court subsequently refused to grant a motion 
by plaintiff for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
said judgment to be in the full amount sought. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN THE 
AMOUNT PRAYED. 
ARGU~1ENT 
POIN·T I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN THE 
AMOUNT PRAYED. 
All the evidence was uncontradicted on the following 
points: The compressor was furnished pursuant to the 
written lease ( Tr. 3). The lease provided that the cost 
of repairs except those necessitated by fair "\Year and 
tear should be borne by defendant (Ex. 1). The break-
down of the machine 'vas not the result of fair wear 
and tear (Tr. 52, 64). ·The work done by plaintiff was 
necessary in order to repair the compressor, and the 
charges made by plaintiff were reasonable in amount 
and were the usual charges made by plaintiff for such 
work. (Tr. 12-19, 80, 81, 83, 88). 
The fact that the court failed to direct the verdict 
on the matter of liability was not prejudicial inasmuch 
as the jury did find in favor of plaintiff, but the failure 
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of the court to direct as to the amount of liability was 
prejudicial. 
Plaintiff had as witnesses all persons who had 
worked on the compressor both in Idaho and in Utah 
and each one gave his account of that portion of the 
"\York done by him. Their testimony was not imp·eached. 
The only ones testifying as to the nature of the repairs 
and charges made therefor were these witnesses of 
plaintiff. Defendant did not even attempt to show that 
the charges were excessive or unreasonable nor that they 
weren't the usual charges made by plaintiff or by anyone 
else in the business. Yet, the court not only submitted 
the question of the amount of the award to the jury but 
even encouraged the jury to bring in a compromise 
verdict by its comments to the jury when asked for 
further instruction ( Tr. 113). Because of the jury's 
request for information as to the cost of repairs to 
plaintiff, it is obvious that the jury wanted to award 
plaintiff a sum which would not include any legitimate 
profit made by plaintiff on the repair job despite the 
fact that the contract provided that such a p~rofit should 
not be excluded. In paragraph 10 of the Lease, it is 
provided: 
"The lessee agrees to pay the lessor its regu-
lar charges for any material or labor furnished." 
(Ex. 1) 
The only evidence offered by defendant after plain-
tiff finished its prima facie case was defendant's job 
superintendent's testimony as to how the machine was 
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used by it and how it stopped working. Defendant's 
only witness said nothing as to repairs (Tr. 95-102). 
It is the duty of the lower court to direct a verdict 
in the situation presented here where all the evidence 
is in plaintiff's favor. 
~1:oore, in discussing the Federal practice, which 
Utah should follow, says: 
"Where no evidence is adduced to disprove 
the prima facie case of the plaintiff and his evi-
dence stands uncontradicted and unimpeached, the 
court should direct." 5 Moore's Federal Practice, 
2314, Note 7. 
In Cannan v. Curkeet, 86 F.2d 573, the court said: 
"It is elementary that, in Federal courts, 
where undisputed evidence demands a verdict in 
favor of one of the parties, it is the duty of the 
judge to direct it.'' 
In Brandon v. Ho.Zman, 41 F.2d 586, a bank cashier, 
according to the undisputed testimony, improperly paid 
out money for his own gain. In affirming a verdict for 
the plain tiff the court said : 
"The verdict should be directed when the 
evidence . . . with all inferences that the jury 
could draw from it, leads to but one conclusion." 
In Colthurst v. Lake J7iew State Bank, 18 F.2d 875, 
in a suit on a note, where the only evidence was to the 
effect that plaintiff was a holder in due course without 
notice, a directed verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed. 
The court said that defendant does not have the right 
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''to have a jury pass upon his claim" nor does "credi-
bility of an uncontradicted and unimpeached \vitness in 
all cases" present a jury question. 
In Campagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 31 F.2d 663, in affirming a directed 
verdict for the plaintiff, the court said: 
"When the plaintiff in error failed to make 
ansvver to the prima facie evidence offered . . . 
it was the duty of the court below to direct the 
verdict." 
In First National Bank & Trust Company of Musko-
gee v. Heilman, 62 F.2d 157, in a suit on a note, where 
the only evidence was to the effect that plaintiff was 
a holder in due course without notice, a directed verdict 
for the plaintiff was denied by the lower court. This was 
reversed. The court said: 
"There are two classes of cases in which the 
trial court should direct a verdict at the close of 
the evidence (1) cases in which the evidence is 
undisputed and (2) cases in which the evidence is 
conflicting but is of so conclusive a character 
that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion ought to set aside a verdict in oppo-
sition thereto .... The rule ap·plies notwithstand-
ing the party introducing the evidence has the 
burden of p·roof. . . . The instant case clearly 
falls within the first class and the trial court 
erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the 
bank.'' 
53 Am. Jur. ·Trials. 
"359. Undisputed Facts Supporting One 
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Conclusion. - The presence or absence of con-
flicting testimony in a case is a consideration by 
which the courts are governed in directing ver-
dicts. Where the material issues or controlling 
facts are conceded, or the proof offered to estab-
lish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or uncon-
troverted, or such facts are conclusively estab-
lished or established beyond dispute, or the evi-
dence is all one way, and is unconflicting and 
uncontradictory, and only one legitmate infer-
ence may be drawn, and there are no circum-
stances which tend to impair or impeach it, and 
it is not susceptible of inherent weaknesses, im-
probabilities, and incongruities which in and of 
themselves naturally arise to contradict or im-
peach the weight and credibility of the utterances 
of the witnesses, the only question being one of 
law, the court may, should, and must, direct a 
verdict. 
"361. Uncontradicted Oral Testimony-While 
it is the province of the jury to determine not 
only the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, 
but the credibility of the witnesses who testify, 
this rule is not t.o be taken as necessarily requir-
ing the trial court to overrule a motion for a 
directed verdict and submit a case to the jury 
in order to p·ermit the jury to pass upon the cred-
ibility of a witness whose testimony is unimpeach-
ed and uncontradicted, and reasonably susceptible 
to but one conclusion - the more generally ap-
proved rule is that it is not only permissable, but 
proper, for a trial court to direct, upon unim-
peached oral testimony given in behalf of the 
party having the burden of proof, where such test-
imony is direct, positive, and unequivocal, is not 
contradicted either directly or indirectly, and is 
not susceptible of inherent weakness, improbabili-
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ty, or incredibility. This p-rinciple underlies the 
great majority of the cases cited in the preceding 
sections which recognize it to be not only within 
the power, but the duty, of the court to direct 
verdicts when undisputed facts support only one 
conclusion, or where a contrary verdict would 
have no support in the evidence. 
"386. When Verdict May Be Directed. -
Again, the plaintiff is entitled to .a direction in 
his favor where the right to recover is overwhelm-
ingly shown, \Vhere the plaintiff's evidence is 
sufficient to warrant a verdict in his favor and 
no evidence has been adduced by the defendant 
appreciably tending to overthrow the case made 
by the plaintiff." 
"Where there is no evidence, direct or circum-
stantial, tending to imp·each the witness upon 
whose testimony an issue is based, the court 
should give mandatory instruction." Citizens 
Trttst & Sav. Bank v. Stackhouse, 91 SC 455, 74 
SE 977, 40 LRA (NS) 454. 
"Where the plaintiff's evidence makes a 
prima facie case, and the defendant offers no 
evidence, the court should, on motion, direct a 
verdict for the plaintiff." Mason v. Sault, 93 
Vt. 412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR 1426. 
"It is fundamental that where there is no 
evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's 
claim, it is the court's duty to direct a verdict. 
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the 
court must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion 
is directed and must resolve every controverted 
fact in his favor. Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 
295, 209 P.2d 566. The inquiry, then, must be di-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
rected toward whether reasonable minds could 
disagree in this case on the evidence presented so 
as to provide a question for the jury." Boskovich 
v. Ut.ah Canst. Co., 123 U. 387, 259 P.2d 885, 886. 
"The credibility, sufficiency, and weight of 
the- evidence on a given subject are for the jury; 
the question whether there is any evidence on the 
subject is for the court. Where the testimony is 
all one way, uncontradicted by any testimony 
given in the case, either from a party's own wit-
nesses or the other side, either in direct or cross-
examination, or by any facts or circumstances in 
the case, and is not ~n itsef in any way improb-
able or discredited, and but one legitimate in-
ference may be drawn from it, and a case is 
thereby made for the plaintiff or the defendant, 
the duty rests upon the court to direct a verdict.'' 
Bo~tdeman v. Arnold, 200 Mich. 162, 166 NW 985, 
8 ALR 789. 
The court should not let the jury bring in any 
amount it desires in disregard of the evidence. The lower 
court sustained an objection to testimony upon the point 
of how much an item cost the plaintiff as distinguished 
from what its regular charge was, (Tr. 32) and then 
turned around and allowed the jury to speculate on that 
very point, even instructing the jury that it may dis-
regard the evidence before it and bring in any portion 
of the repair bill it desired (Tr. 113). Such is not the 
concept of "jury trial'' as set out by the above authorities. 
The jury should not be allo,ved to apply its own 
concept of what the law should be, in a case involving 
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the construction of a vvritten contract, where the fact~ 
are undisputed. The construction of the written contract 
and the application thereof to the undisputed facts was 
the province of the court and not the jury. The anno-
tation at 65 A.L.R. 648, 650, cites many cases to the 
effect that the interpretation or construction of a written 
contract is a question of law for the court. The anno-
tation states : 
"The following quotation from O'Connor v. 
West Sacramento ·Co. (1922) 189 ·Cal. 7, 207 Pac. 
527, embodies vvhat may be fairly regarded as 
the position taken in the cases in which the courts 
consciously regard the line "\vhich separates the 
functon of the court from that of the jury, though 
naturally there is considerable variation even 
among such cases in formal statement of the 
principle: 'The construction of a contract is al-
ways a matter of law for the court, no matter 
how ambiguous or uncertain or difficult its terms, 
and the jury can only assist the court by de-
termining disputed questions of fact. If the facts 
and circumstances to be considered in the inter-
pretation of the contract are undisputed, there is 
nothing to submit to the jury and the court must 
direct a verdict in accordance with the construc-
tion placed on the contract by the court, in the 
light of the admitted circumstances .... ' '' 
There is no evidence upon which the jury could 
justifiably reduce the claim of $3,580.52, which was fully 
supported by the evidence, to the round figure of 
$2,500.00. 
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CO·NCLUSION 
Prejudicial error was made which can 1e corrected 
by the Supreme Court without the necessity of a new 
trial by ruling that the lower court should have directed 
a verdict in plaintff's favor in the sum of $3,580.52 as 
prayed, together with interest thereon from September 
12, 1958, the date the statemPnt of nlaintiff became due 
and payable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & 
LOWE, John W. Lowe 
Attorneys for PlaintiJff 
and Appellant 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake·City, Utah 
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